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INTRODUCTION 
Recent Supreme Court cases have recognized the science underlying the common-sense notion that children are not "little adults." Their 
brains function in a completely different manner than those of adults. In 
2005, the Court abolished the juvenile death penalty and recognized the 
neuroscience underlying the claim that those under the age of eighteen 
should not be subject to the ultimate punishment due to the fundamental 
immaturity of their brains. 1 Later cases, discussed in depth below, 
followed similar reasoning in abolishing life without parole for non-
homicides for juvenile offenders2 and in holding that juvenile offenders 
cannot be subjected to a mandatory life sentence even for homicide. 3 In 
each of these cases, the Court applied an Eighth Amendment analysis. 4 In 
contrast, cases assessing the constitutionality of procedures employed in 
juvenile delinquency courts employ the "fundamental fairness" test 
dictated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 
1 Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573-74, 578 (2004). 
2 Graham v. Florida, 540 U.S. 48, 68-69, 80 (2010). 
3 Millerv. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2482 (2012). 
4 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 ("[T]he Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing 
scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders."); 
Graham, 540 U.S. at 79 ("Terrance Graham's sentence guarantees he will die in prison 
without any meaningful opportunity to obtain release, no matter what he might do to 
demonstrate that the bad acts he committed as a teenager are not representative of his true 
character, even if he spends the next half century attempting to atone for his crimes and 
learn from his mistakes. The State has denied him any chance to later demonstrate that he 
is fit to rejoin society based solely on a non-homicide crime that he committed while he 
was a child in the eyes of the law. This the Eighth Amendment does not permit."); Roper, 
125 U.S. at 578 ("The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death 
penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed."). 
5 See McKeiverv. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1971) ("We do not mean by 
this to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a 
criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing 
must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment."); In re Gault, 387 
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The first cases to evaluate the constitutionality of the procedures 
used to transfer juveniles to adult court utilized a due process framework. 6 
This was consistent with the analysis of early cases that reviewed the 
procedures used in delinquency court. 7 This article argues that, in light of 
the Court's holdings in Roper, Graham, and Miller, direct file procedures 
must also be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. As Justice Fortas 
noted in Kent, the "decision as to waiver of jurisdiction and transfer of the 
matter to the [adult criminal court] was potentially as important to 
petitioner as the difference between five years' confinement and a death 
sentence." 8 In most states, juvenile jurisdiction ends, at the latest, at the 
child's twenty-first birthday. In Florida, for example, the maximum 
sentence that can be imposed on a juvenile is commitment to a juvenile 
commitment program for the length of time applicable to an adult, or until 
the child's nineteenth birthday, whichever is shorter. 9 Therefore, a sixteen-
U.S. 1, 31-59 (1967) (applying due process analysis to determine what procedures were 
required to protect the rights of juveniles charged in delinquency court; due process was 
held to require adequate written notice of the charges, the right to counsel, the right to 
confront and cross-examine the State's witnesses, and the right to remain silent); Kent v. 
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555, 564-65 (1966) (assessing the constitutionality of 
judicial transfer of juvenile to adult court by stating: "We do not mean by this to indicate 
that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or 
even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure 
up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment."); see also Gallegos v. Colorado, 
370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962) ("The youth of the petitioner, the long detention, the failure to 
send for his parents, the failure immediately to bring him before the judge of the Juvenile 
Court, the failure to see to it that he had the advice of a lawyer or a friend-all these 
combine to make us conclude that the formal confession on which this conviction was 
obtained in violation of due process."); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600-01(1948) 
(holding that Due Process Clause did not permit admission of a statement of a fifteen-
year-old that was taken under circumstances that did not comport with fundamental 
fairness). 
6 See supra, note 5. 
7 See Kent, 383 U.S. at 555, 564-65. 
8 Id. at 546. 
9 See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 985.455(3) (West 2013). 
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year old facing a charge of armed burglary of a dwelling can be sentenced 
to a juvenile commitment facility until his nineteenth birthday if the case 
is filed in juvenile court. In stark contrast, if the juvenile is charged as an 
adult, he faces several decades in prison, perhaps as many as seventy 
years. 10 Given that the result of an adult charge could be the equivalent of 
life in prison-and in light of the developmental neuroscience recognized 
by the Supreme Court-procedures used to transfer youth to adult criminal 
courts must comport with the Eighth Amendment. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND PURPORTED PURPOSE OF JUVENILE 
COURTS 
This article addresses cases that are transferred from juvenile 
delinquency court to adult criminal court. Delinquency proceedings are 
proceedings in juvenile court in which children are charged with 
"delinquent acts"-the juvenile equivalent of an adult crime. In most 
states, the law provides that delinquent acts are not crimes. 11 While every 
state has a juvenile court system today, the role of juvenile court has 
changed over time; "[a]t the dawn of the twentieth century, progressive 
reformers applied the new theories of social control to the new ideas about 
childhood and created a social welfare alternative to criminal courts to 
treat criminal and noncriminal misconduct by youth." 12 After several 
10 In Florida, armed burglary of a dwelling is punishable by life in prison for an 
adult. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.02 (West 2011). A case currently pending before the 
Florida Supreme Court illustrates the potential sentences faced by youth charged as 
adults. See Gridine v. State, 89 So. 3d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). In Gridine, a 
fourteen-year-old was sentenced to seventy years without parole for an attempted armed 
robbery committed with a twelve-year-old. Id. at 910. Under Florida law, he will not be 
eligible for parole until he is seventy-seven. Id.; see also Erik Eckholm, Juveniles Facing 
Lifelong Terms Despite Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2014, at Al. 
11 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 985.35(6) (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN.§ 15-11-606 
(West 2014); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§ 380.1 (McKinney 2007). 
12 Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MlNN. L. REV. 691, 
691 (1991). 
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decades of reform, delinquency courts now closely resemble adult 
criminal courts. 13 Barry Feld has identified three types of reform affecting 
the juvenile court system: jurisdictional, jurisprudential, and procedural. 14 
Recent years have seen an increase in society's desire to criminalize the 
conduct of children. While penalties have become harsher and juvenile 
sanctions have become more like criminal sanctions, juvenile courts are 
not required to provide children with the same protections afforded to 
adult defendants. According to Feld, "[a]lthough theoretically, juvenile 
courts' procedural safeguards closely resemble those of criminal courts, in 
reality, the justice routinely afforded juveniles is lower than the minimum 
insisted upon for adults." 15 Feld argues: 
The substantive and procedural convergence between 
juvenile and criminal courts eliminates virtually all of the 
differences in strategies of social control between youths 
and adults. As a result, no reason remains to maintain a 
separate juvenile court whose only distinction is its 
persisting procedural deficiencies. Yet, even with the 
juvenile court's transformation from an informal, 
rehabilitative agency into a scaled-down criminal court, it 
continues to operate virtually unreformed. The juvenile 
court's continued existence despite these changes reflects 
an ambivalence about children and their control, and 
provides an opportunity to re-examine basic assumptions 
about the nature and competence of young people. 16 
Historically, youth in delinquency court were not afforded all of 
the protections given to adults facing criminal charges. 17 This was because 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 692. 
ls Id. 
16 Id. at 692-93. 
17 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967) ("The early reformers were appalled by 
adult procedures and penalties, and by the fact that children could be given long prison 
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juvenile court was seen as a way for the state to step in where children 
were engaging in socially unacceptable behavior, often due to lack of 
supervision at home. 18 Some have noted a distinct class element to early 
juvenile courts, arguing that such courts were a way for society to exercise 
control over "lower-class" youth. 19 A report submitted by the Cook 
County (Illinois) Bar Association to the Illinois state legislature in support 
of the creation of the first juvenile court stated that: 
The fundamental idea of the Juvenile Court Law is that the 
State must step in and exercise guardianship over a child 
found under such adverse social or individual conditions as 
develop crime. . . It proposes a plan whereby he may be 
treated, not as a criminal, or legally charged with a crime, 
but as a ward of the state. 20 
Over time, however, the courts, including the United States Supreme 
Court, began to recognize that the ideal of kindly juvenile judges who 
used their wide discretion to help at-risk children was far from the reality 
sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals. They were profoundly convinced 
that society's duty to the child could not be confined by the concept of justice alone. They 
believed that society's role was not to ascertain whether the child was 'guilty' or 
'innocent,' but 'What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in 
his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career.' The 
child-essentially good, as they saw it-was to be made 'to feel that he is the object of 
(the state's) care and solicitude,' not that he was under arrest or on trial. The rules of 
criminal procedure were therefore altogether inapplicable."). 
18 History and Philosophy of the Juvenile Court, in FLA. Juv. LAW AND PRACTICE 1-
6 (11th ed. 2009) [hereinafter FLA. Juv. LAW AND PRACTICE]. 
19 Id. ("Early juvenile law generally grew from citizen concern for children who, 
lacking parental control, discipline, and supervision, were coming before the criminal 
court for truancy, begging, homelessness, and petty criminal activity. There were distinct 
social phenomena that contributed to these problems, including a large population of 
children from broken families in the aftermath of the Civil War, latchkey children of 
parents who were unable to provide supervision during long work hours, lack of child 
care, and lack of free or compulsory education for children."). 
2
° FLA. Juv. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 18, at 1-3. 
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faced every day by children in delinquency court. 21 In the seminal case of 
In re Gault, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that 
unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is 
frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure. In 
1937, Dean Pound wrote: "The powers of the Star Chamber 
were a trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile 
courts" .... The absence of substantive standards has not 
necessarily meant that children receive careful, 
compassionate, individualized treatment. The absence of 
procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has not 
always produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures. 
Departures from established principles of due process have 
frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in 
arbitrariness. 22 
The facts of Gault demonstrate just how dangerous giving any 
judge unbridled discretion can be. One afternoon in 1964, a fifteen-year-
old named Gerald Francis Gault and a friend purportedly made a prank 
phone call. 23 As eloquently described by Justice Fortas, the calls "were of 
the irritatingly offensive, adolescent, sex variety."24 At the time of the 
"offense," Gerald was on probation because he had been caught in the 
company of another teenager who stole a wallet. 25 Gerald was taken into 
custody while both of his parents were at work. 26 No notice was left for 
21 In Gault, the Court traced the historical development of juvenile delinquency court 
and demonstrated that, as the consequences of a juvenile adjudication of delinquency 
became more severe, procedures similar to those used in adult criminal court were 
required by the Due Process Clause. 387 U.S. at 13-18. 
22 Id. at 17-18. 
23 Id. at 4. 
24 Id. at 4-5. 
2s Id. 
26 Id. at 5. 
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the parents, and no attempt was made to contact them to let them know 
that their son was in custody. 27 Upon learning of her son's whereabouts 
from a neighbor, Gerald's mother went to the detention home, where 
Gerald's probation officer told her of her son's alleged acts and informed 
her that there would be a hearing the next day. 28 The probation officer 
filed a petition in juvenile court that Gerald's parents did not see until a 
federal habeas proceeding was brought.29 The petition did not allege any 
factual basis for the court proceeding. 30 At the "hearing" the next day, the 
complainant was not present, and no transcript or written memorandum of 
the proceedings was created. 31 Gerald was questioned by the judge but 
was not told that he had a right to remain silent. 32 A few days later, 
without explanation, Gerald was released. 33 Shortly thereafter, his parents 
were notified simply that there would be another hearing. 34 Once again, 
the complainant was not present, and Gerald testified without having been 
advised of his constitutional rights. 35 Gerald's mother specifically 
requested the presence of the complainant so that she could identify which 
of the two boys had actually made the lewd remarks. 36 At the hearing, a 
referral report was sent to the court by the probation officers, but was not 
sent to Gerald or his parents. 37 At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge 
21 Id. 
2s Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 6. 
34 Id. at 7. 
3s Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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committed Gerald to the State Industrial School as a juvenile delinquent 
until his twenty-first birthday, "unless sooner discharged by due process of 
law." 38 At no point were Gerald or his parents advised that he had a right 
to counsel. 39 In essence, Gerald was sentenced to six years in juvenile 
prison for a prank phone call without any notice of the charges, without 
having been able to cross-examine the complainant, without knowledge 
that he could remain silent, and without the advice of counsel. 
In Gault, the Court reevaluated the juvenile justice system and held 
that many of the fundamental protections afforded to criminal defendants 
must be afforded to children facing charges in delinquency court. The 
Court noted the severe consequences of a juvenile adjudication of 
delinquency, and stated that "it would be extraordinary if our Constitution 
did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied 
in the phrase 'due process.' Under our Constitution, the condition of being 
a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."40 
The Court held that due process requires that children be given 
notice of the charges against them,41 that the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments require that children be advised of their right to counsel, that 
they be provided with counsel if they cannot afford counsel, 42 that the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments require that children be able to 
38 Id. at 7-8. 
39 Id. at 10. 
40 Id. at 27-28. 
41 Id. at 31-34 ("Due process oflaw requires notice of the sort we have described-
that is, notice which would be deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal 
proceeding. It does not allow a hearing to be held in which a youth's freedom and his 
parents' right to his custody are at stake without giving them timely notice, in advance of 
the hearing, of the specific issues that they must meet."). 
42 Id. at 34-42 ("The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems 
oflaw, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, 
and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The child 
'requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him."') 
(quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)). 
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confront and cross-examine the witnesses against them, and that children 
may invoke the right against self-incrimination. 43 The Court specifically 
rejected the argument that this right should not apply to children because 
confession is therapeutic. 44 A few years later, the Court held that every 
element of the offense charged in a petition for delinquency must be 
proven to the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 45 However, a year 
later, the Court held that children are not entitled to a jury in delinquency 
43 Id. at 42-57 ("It would indeed be surprising ifthe privilege against self-
incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children."). While the Court 
declined to rule on the child's argument that the Constitution requires appellate review of 
juvenile delinquency proceedings and the right to a transcript of such proceedings, most 
states provide for transcription of delinquency proceedings and appellate review of these 
proceedings. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.534 (West 2007) (providing a right to 
appeal from an adjudication of delinquency); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.830 (providing for written 
transcripts of all proceedings in delinquency court). 
44 Gault, 387 U.S. at 51 ("It is also urged ... that the juvenile and presumably his 
parents should not be advised of the juvenile's right to silence because confession is good 
for the child as the commencement of the assumed therapy of the juvenile court process, 
and he should be encouraged to assume an attitude of trust and confidence toward the 
officials of the juvenile process. This proposition has been subjected to widespread 
challenge on the basis of current reappraisals of the rhetoric and realities of the handling 
of juvenile offenders. In fact, evidence is accumulating that confessions by juveniles do 
not aid in 'individualized treatment,' as the court below put it, and that compelling the 
child to answer questions, without warning or advice as to his right to remain silent, does 
not seIVe this or any other good purpose .... [I]t seems probable that where children are 
induced to confess by 'paternal' urgings on the part of officials and the confession is then 
followed by disciplinary action, the child's reaction is likely to be hostile and adverse-
the child may well feel that he has been led or tricked into confession and that despite his 
confession, he is being punished."). 
45 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364-69 (1970) (noting that "[t]he Due Process 
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged" and that 
such a right is applicable to children "during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency 
proceeding"). 
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proceedings. 46 In most states, a juvenile judge presides over all pretrial 
proceedings and the adjudicatory hearing. 47 
The Court's rationale in holding that children are not entitled to a 
jury in delinquency proceedings was based upon the notion that juvenile 
proceedings are supposed to be rehabilitative rather than punitive. The 
standard of due process required in juvenile delinquency proceedings, as 
developed in Gault and Winship, is "fundamental fairness." 48 Despite 
acknowledging the many flaws in the juvenile system as it existed at the 
time-and acknowledging that the juvenile system could impose the 
functional equivalent of prison on children-the Court held that a jury is 
not required in a delinquency proceeding. The Court explained: 
Concern about the inapplicability of exclusionary and other 
rules of evidence, about the juvenile court judge's possible 
awareness of the juvenile's prior record and of the contents 
of the social file; about repeated appearances of the same 
familiar witnesses in the persons of juvenile and probation 
officers and social workers-all to the effect that this will 
create the likelihood of pre-judgment-chooses to ignore it 
seems to us, every aspect of fairness, of concern, of 
sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court 
system contemplates. 49 
While the primary purpose of juvenile court may at one point have been 
rehabilitation, 50 that is no longer the case today. The legislative intent for 
46 See McKeiverv. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 549-50 (1971) (holding that a jury 
is not constitutionally required in juvenile delinquency proceedings). 
47 See, e.g., FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.llO(c) ("The adjudicatory hearing shall be conducted 
by the judge without a jury. At this hearing the court determines whether the allegations 
of the petition have been sustained."). 
48 See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543. 
49 Id. at 550. 
50 See generally Feld, supra note 12. 
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the juvenile justice system in most states51 is to protect the public from 
acts of delinquency. 52 Preventing delinquency, strengthening the family, 
early intervention, and rehabilitation are often listed as secondary goals of 
the juvenile justice system. 53 It appears that Justice Fortas' warning in 
Kent over forty years ago is more applicable today than ever: "[T]here 
may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both 
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the 
solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children." 54 
II. HISTORY OF TRANSFERRING YOUTH TO ADULT CRIMINAL 
COURT 
In Kent, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the 
transfer statute then in effect in the District of Columbia. 55 The statute 
51 A few states, however, still prioritize the rehabilitation and care of the child. See, 
e.g., LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 801 (1992) (providing that each child facing delinquency 
proceedings receive the "care, guidance and control that will be conducive to his 
welfare"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-402 (West 1994) (providing for "individualized 
accountability and individualized treatment" in the delinquency system). 
52 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 19-2-102 (West 1997) ("[T]he intent ofthis 
article is to protect, restore and improve the public safety by creating a system of juvenile 
justice that will appropriately sanction juveniles who violate the law and, in certain cases, 
will also provide the opportunity to bring together affected victims, the community and 
the juvenile offenders for restorative purposes."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.02(3) (West 
1997) (stating that legislative intent of the juvenile justice system is "to first protect the 
public from acts of delinquency"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3 § 3085c(c)(l)(A) (2013) (stating 
that a juvenile justice system should "[h]old juveniles accountable for their unlawful 
conduct"); Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 938.01 (West 2009) ("It is the intent of the legislature to 
promote a juvenile justice system capable of dealing with the problem of juvenile 
delinquency, a system which will protect the community, impose accountability for 
violations of law and equip juvenile offenders with competencies to live responsibly and 
productively."). 
53 See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 985.02(3)(a)-(d) (West 2014). 
54 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). 
55 Id. at 541. 
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allowed a judge in juvenile court to transfer a case for prosecution in the 
adult criminal system without holding a hearing and without giving any 
reasons for her decision. 56 The Court held that this transfer procedure did 
not comport with the fundamental fairness required by the Due Process 
Clause, noting: 
[A]s a condition to a valid waiver order, petitioner was 
entitled to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the 
social records and probation or similar reports which 
presumably are considered by the court, and to a statement 
of reasons for the Juvenile Court's decision. We believe 
that this result is required by the statute read in the context 
of constitutional principles relating to due process and the 
assistance of counsel. 57 
After Kent, many states reassessed their transfer statutes and 
procedures, purportedly in order to comply with the Court's ruling. The 
result, however, was that many of these new statutes in effect made it 
easier for the state to transfer juveniles to adult court and significantly 
limited-or, in some cases, eliminated completely-the role of the 
juvenile judge and the child's counsel in juvenile court. A study of state 
transfer laws revealed that, "[i]n the 1980s and 1990s, legislatures in 
nearly every state expanded transfer laws that allowed or required the 
prosecution of juveniles in adult criminal courts." 58 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 557. 
58 PA TRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, TRYING JUVENILES AS 
ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 1 (2011) [hereinafter 
ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS], available at 
https://ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/232434.pdf. The introduction to the study explains how 
difficult it is to acquire accurate statistics on the transfer of juveniles into the adult 
criminal system, noting that: 
[T]here are no national data sets that track youth who have been tried 
and sentenced in the criminal justice system. Moreover, state data are 
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Youths can be transferred to adult court in several ways. Judicial 
waiver laws "allow juvenile courts to waive jurisdiction on a case-by-case 
basis."59 There are three types of judicial waiver: discretionary, 
presumptive, and mandatory. 60 Typically, these statutes set forth standards 
to guide the judge's discretion. 61 Some judicial waiver statutes, however, 
make waiver into the adult system presumptive in certain cases and put the 
burden on the defense to demonstrate why the case should remain in 
juvenile court.62 Some states go so far as to mandate judicial transfer in 
certain cases. 63 Many states leave the decision to transfer a youth to the 
Id. 
hard to find and even more difficult to assess accurately ... Currently, 
only 13 states publicly report tlle total number of their transfers, and 
even fewer report offense profiles, demographic characteristics, or 
details regarding processing and sentencing. Although nearly 14,000 
transfers can be derived from available 2007 sources, data from 29 
states are missing from tllat total. 
59 Id. at 2. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 3 (noting that forty-five states have discretionary judicial waiver statutes: 
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of 
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Fifteen states 
have presumptive judicial transfer statutes: Alaska, California, Colorado, District of 
Columbia, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Utah. Fifteen states have mandatory 
judicial transfer statutes: Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia). 
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adult system solely in the hands of the prosecution. 64 The prosecutor is 
allowed to determine whether charges will be filed in juvenile or adult 
court. 65 Such statutes are commonly known as "direct file" statutes. 66 A 
typical direct file statute provides criteria for discretionary and mandatory 
direct file of an information in adult criminal court. 67 Fifteen states give 
the prosecutor complete discretion to charge a youth directly in adult 
criminal court, thereby bypassing a judicial hearing in juvenile court. 68 
Finally, statutory exclusion laws give adult criminal courts exclusive 
jurisdiction over certain classes of cases involving juvenile offenders. 69 
Before analyzing the constitutionality of transfer statutes, it is 
important to remember that the United States Supreme Court has never 
acknowledged a constitutional right to be tried in juvenile court. 70 In 
upholding transfer statutes, courts have relied on the fact that the right to 
64 Id. at 2. 
6s Id. 
66 Id. at 12. For an example of a direct file statute, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.557 
(West 2011) (describing direct filing of information, as well as discretionary and 
mandatory criteria). 
67 Id. at 2 (noting that most transfer statutes provide broad guidelines and specific 
eligibility criteria that often include age and/or a specified level of offense). 
68 ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS, supra note 58, at 3 (noting that the fifteen 
states with prosecutorial direct file statutes are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, 
Oklahoma, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming). 
69 Id. (noting the twenty-nine states that have statutory exclusion laws: Alabama, 
Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New 
Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Utah, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin). 
70 See, e.g., Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 1088 (1978) (stating that United States Supreme Court has never recognized a 
right for juveniles to be tried in juvenile court). 
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be tried in juvenile court is a right that is granted by the state legislature. 71 
As such, the legislature may dictate the procedures and rights of juvenile 
defendants, as long as the legislature does so in a manner that comports 
with due process. 72 The Supreme Court has not yet set forth any criteria 
that must be met in order to satisfy the Constitution before a youth is 
transferred to adult criminal court. 73 
Courts construing mandatory waiver and direct file statutes have 
held them to be constitutional, despite the Supreme Court's holding in 
Kent. Kent held that if a transfer hearing is held, such a hearing must 
comport with due process. Courts have found that mandatory waiver and 
direct file statutes do not implicate the procedures mandated by Kent 
because they bypass a hearing in juvenile court entirely. For example, a 
Virginia appellate court upheld a mandatory transfer statute against a 
challenge by a youth on the grounds that, under Kent, he was 
constitutionally entitled to a transfer hearing in juvenile court. 74 The 
statute at issue provided for automatic transfer to adult court where the 
juvenile court found probable cause to believe that the youth was at least 
fourteen and had committed the offense of murder. 75 
The youth argued that, pursuant to Kent, "he had a constitutional 
right to a transfer hearing and to representation by counsel at that hearing 
before being stripped of his juvenile status and being tried as an adult."76 
71 See, e.g., W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Alaska 1986) (noting that 
juvenile courts are a creature of statute and, as such, the legislature can prescribe 
procedures for those courts within constitutional boundaries). 
n Id. 
73 See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 537 (1975) ("[T]he Court has never attempted to 
prescribe criteria for, or the nature and quantum of evidence that must support, a decision 
to transfer a juvenile for trial in adult court."); see also Stokes v. Fair, 581F.2d287, 289 
(1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1078 (1979). 
74 See Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 578 S.E.2d 78, 82-83 (Va. Ct. App. 2003). 
75 VA. CODE ANN.§ 16.1-269.1(West2012). 
76 Rodriguez, 578 S.E.2d at 80-81. 
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The Virginia court distinguished Kent on the ground that the youth in that 
case had a statutory right to be tried in juvenile court, whereas the Virginia 
statute mandated that the youth be charged as an adult under the 
circumstances.77 The court found no constitutional right to a transfer 
hearing, and limited Kent to its construction of the particular statute at 
issue.78 Essentially, the Virginia court found that, if a statute provides for a 
transfer hearing, such a hearing must comport with due process, but that 
the Constitution does not prevent a state from charging a juvenile directly 
in adult court without a transfer hearing. 79 
Given that direct file and mandatory transfer statutes have been in 
existence for decades, it is unlikely that a due process challenge to these 
statutes will succeed. However, the Court's evolving application of the 
Eighth Amendment to juvenile punishments-which has been informed by 
developmental neuroscience-might provide a new vehicle to challenge 
direct file and mandatory transfer statutes. 
III. THE COURT'S EVOLVING RECOGNITION OF DEVELOPMENTAL 
NEUROSCIENCE AND ITS IMPACT ON EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
As noted above, the United States Supreme Court has recently 
decided several landmark cases recognizing the fundamental principle that 
77 Id. at 81-83 ("[T]he Court's references to Kent's constitutional rights to due 
process and counsel arose in the context of the hearing and other procedures expressly 
provided for by the transfer statute at issue in that case .... Appellant has cited no 
controlling legal authority providing that a juvenile defendant has a constitutional right to 
a transfer hearing before being treated as an adult. The cases he cites provide, at most, 
that juvenile proceedings, including transfer proceedings, when provided for by statute, 
must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment." (emphasis in 
original)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
78 Id. at 81-83. 
79 Id. at 81. 
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children are different from adults. 80 Each of these cases relied to a large 
extent on developing science demonstrating that children's brains function 
in a fundamentally different manner than those of adults. As the Roper 
Court noted, teenagers are generally less mature, more prone to reckless 
behavior, and much more susceptible to negative influences than adults; 
the possibility of rehabilitation is also greater for teenagers than for 
adults. 81 An amicus brief relied upon by the Graham court explains 
succinctly how children's brains are different. For example, even older 
adolescents "are less able to restrain their impulses and exercise self-
control; less capable than adults of considering alternative courses of 
action and maturely weighing risks and rewards; and less oriented to the 
future and thus less capable of apprehending the consequences of their 
often-impulsive actions."82 Teenagers are much more likely to be 
influenced by negative peers and, because they are not adults, lack the 
autonomy to escape such influences even if they desire to do so. 83 Because 
a significant amount of juvenile criminal behavior is attributable to the 
transient characteristics of youth, research has shown that the vast 
majority of youthful offenders do not continue to engage in criminal 
behavior as adults. 84 Yet, as the science of juvenile brain development has 
80 See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011) (holding that a child's 
age must be taken into account in determining whether a child was in custody when "it 
was known ... or would have been objectively apparent to the reasonable officer" for 
purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Graham v. Florida, 540 U.S. 48, 
82 (2010) (abolishing life without parole for children convicted of crimes other than 
homicide); Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2004) (abolishing the juvenile death 
penalty). 
81 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70. 
82 Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric 
Association, National Association of Social Workers, and Mental Health America as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3-4, Graham v. Florida, 540 U.S. 48 (2010) (No. 
08-7412), 2009 WL 2236778, at *4 (internal quotations omitted). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
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advanced considerably, there have not been any corresponding major 
changes in the way cases are transferred from delinquency court to adult 
criminal court. 
The Court has long recognized that cognitive functioning is 
relevant to an Eighth Amendment analysis of a particular punishment. 85 In 
the context of the death penalty, the Court specifically recognized that 
youth is a mitigating factor that must be considered by the sentencing 
jury. 86 In 1982, prior to the recent progress in developmental 
neuroscience, the Supreme Court recognized the fundamental, 
commonsense fact that children are different than adults. 87 The Court 
stated that "the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating 
factor of great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional 
development of a youthful defendant be duly considered in sentencing."88 
Further, in 2002, the Court expressly recognized the link between 
cognitive functioning and criminal culpability. 89 In holding that the Eighth 
Amendment bars the execution of the mentally retarded, the Court held 
that "[b ]ecause of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and 
control of their impulses, [mentally retarded offenders] do not act with the 
level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal 
85 See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 607-08 (1978) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment requires a capital sentencing jury to be allowed to consider "any aspect of 
the defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the 
defendant proffers for a sentence less than death"); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 163-
64 (1976) (holding that, in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment, jury must 
consider any mitigating circumstances). While Lockett and Gregg were capital cases, 
their recognition that the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of any relevant 
mitigating factors is applicable to the analysis that follows. 
86 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982). 
87 Id. at 115-16. 
88 Id. at 116. 
89 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment 
bars the execution of the mentally retarded). 
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conduct." 90 This holding provided the basis for the Court's decision in 
Roper, which banned the juvenile death penalty. 91 In Roper, the Court 
recognized that developmental neuroscience has demonstrated that the 
brains of teenagers are fundamentally different from those of adults in 
ways that directly affect culpability, 92 noting that "[t]he susceptibility of 
juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means their irresponsible 
conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult." 93 Indeed, 
"[t]he relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that 
the signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the 
impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can 
subside."94 In Graham, the Court, relying on Roper, recognized that 
"[t]hese salient characteristics mean that '[i]t is difficult even for expert 
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender 
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption. "' 95 
In Roper, the Court relied on several scientific studies analyzing 
juvenile brain development. 96 Several professional associations wrote and 
submitted an amicus brief to the Roper court. 97 The amicus brief in Roper 
90 Id. at 306. 
91 Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
92 Id. at 570 (noting that the personality traits of children are less formed than those 
of adults). 
93 Id. at 570. 
94 Id. 
95 Graham v. Florida, 540 U.S. 48, 73 (2010). 
96 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less 
Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, 
and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)). 
97 Brief of the American Medical Association, American Psychiatric Association, 
American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, American Academy of Child & Adolescent 
Psychiatry, American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, National Association of 
Social Workers, Missouri Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers, and 
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detailed the ways in which the brains of youth differ in structure and 
functioning from those of adults. The authors explained that the regions of 
the brain associated with impulse control, regulation of emotions, risk 
assessment, and moral reasoning are among the last to develop, and often 
are not fully developed until the early to mid-twenties. 98 The authors also 
found that "[p]sychosocial maturity is incomplete until age 19." 99 In a 
finding of particular relevance to youth involved in the juvenile justice 
system, the authors cited studies showing that "the deficiencies in the 
adolescent mind and emotional and social development are especially 
pronounced when other factors-such as stress, emotions and peer 
pressure-enter the equation. These factors operate on an adolescent's 
mind differently and with special force." 100 
Further, scientists confirm that "[a]dolescents' behavioral 
immaturity mirrors the anatomical immaturity of their brains." 101 Studies 
have shown that adolescents rely more than adults on the amygdala, the 
area of the brain associated with the primitive impulses of anger, 
National Mental Health Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4, 
Roperv. Sinunons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549, at *l 
[hereinafter Roper Brief]. 
98 Id. at *4 (noting that the tests that formed the basis of its conclusions were 
performed on healthy adolescents and that those in the criminal justice system often 
"suffer from serious psychological disturbances that substantially exacerbate the already 
existing vulnerabilities of youth, [such that] they can be expected to function at sub-
standard levels"). 
99 Id. at *7 ("Adolescents score lower on measures of self-reliance and other aspects 
of personal responsibility, they have more difficulty seeing things in long-term 
perspective, they are less likely to look at things from the perspective of others and they 
have more difficulty restraining their aggressive impulses.") (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
100 Id. at *7-8 ("Stress affects cognitive abilities, including the ability to weigh costs 
and benefits and to override impulses with rational thought. Adolescents are more 
susceptible to stress from daily events, which translates into further distortion of the 
already skewed cost-benefit analysis."). 
101 Id. at *10. 
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aggression, and fear. 102 In contrast, adults tend to process similar 
information through the frontal cortex, a cerebral area associated with 
impulse control and good judgment. 103 The frontal and pre-frontal cortex, 
critical areas of the brain that control impulse, judgment, risk-taking, and 
weighing consequences, are among the last to develop and, often, are not 
fully developed until the mid-twenties. 104 
The picture below contains MRI images that demonstrate the 
structural changes that take place in the brain from ages five to twenty. 105 
Researchers at the National Institutes of Health, the National Institute of 
Mental Health, and the University of California at Los Angeles conducted 
a decade-long study using magnetic resonance imaging to track the 
development of the brain. 106 The study concluded that "'higher-order' 
brain centers, such as the prefrontal cortex, don't fully develop until young 
adulthood as grey matter107 wanes in a back-to-front wave as the brain 
matures and neural connections are pruned." 108 In the MRI scans below, 
red indicates more grey matter and blue indicates less grey matter. 109 As 
any adult can attest, teenagers lack the "brakes" that keep them from 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Paul Thompson, Ph.D., MRI Images Taken From Time-Lapse Imaging Tracks 
Brain Maturation from ages 5 to 20, in The Adolescent Brain-Why Teenagers Think and 
Act Differently, EDINFORMATICS, (Sept. 14, 2014), 
http://www.edinforrnatics.com/news/teenage_brains.htm. 
106 Id. 
107 Roper Brief, supra note 97, at *18-20. One of the last parts of the brain to mature 
is the pre-frontal cortex. Id. at 16. This process is known as "pruning;" pruning of gray 
matter improves the functioning of the brain's reasoning centers by establishing some 
pathways while extinguishing others, thereby enhancing brain functioning. Id. at 18. 
108 Thompson, supra note 105. 
109 Id. 
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engaging in impulsive and reckless activities. 110 The "brakes" are located 
in the frontal lobe-the last part of the brain to develop. m Many other 
changes take place in the brain between birth and adulthood. 112 
As noted above, these conclusions were drawn from studies 
performed on the brains of normal adolescents. Many of the youth facing 
charges in delinquency court are at-risk youth who are either in foster care 
110 Id. 
rn Id. 
112 See Roper Brief, supra note 97, at *15-17 ("[The] limbic system is more active in 
adolescent brains than adult brains, particularly in the region of the amygdala and [] the 
frontal lobes of the adolescent brain are less active ... [A]s teenagers grow into adults, 
they increasingly shift the overall focus of brain activity to the frontal lobes ... [T]he 
brain's frontal lobes are still structurally immature well into late adolescence. The 
prefrontal cortex (which [is] associated with impulse control, risk assessment and moral 
reasoning) is 'one of the last brain regions to mature' ... [Additionally,] [ m]yelination is 
the process by which the brain's axons are coated with a fatty white substance called 
myelin. The presence of myelin makes communication between different parts of the 
brain faster and more reliable. Myelination ... continues through adolescence and into 
adulthood."). 
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or unstable, often violent homes; 113 if they attend school at all, they attend 
alternative schools. 114 It is also well documented that poor and minority 
113 See Joseph Tulman, Disability and Delinquency: How Failures to Jdentifj;, 
Accommodate and Serve Youth with Education-Related Disabilities Leads to Their 
Disproportionate Representation in the Delinquency System, 3 WHITTIER J. CHILD. & 
FAM. ADvoc. 3, 5 (2003) ("Of the 100,000 children who are arrested and incarcerated 
each year, as many as 50 percent suffer from a mental or emotional disturbance."). 
Tulman powerfully summarizes the situation concerning children with education-related 
disabilities in the delinquency system, noting that: 
Poor educational performance among children in the delinquency 
system is, in significant part, a function of the high percentage of 
children in that system who have education-related disabilities and 
who, more particularly, have not received the benefit of appropriate, 
and effective special education services. Indeed, the majority of 
children in the juvenile delinquency system are children with 
education-related disabilities. The delinquency system 
disproportionately attracts children with education-related disabilities 
both because those children are more likely to engage in delinquent 
conduct than their non-disabled peers and because the adults 
responsible for educational and delinquency systems are more likely to 
label and treat children with education-related disabilities as delinquent. 
Poor educational outcomes that are pervasive among children in the 
delinquency system constitute, in several respects, compelling evidence 
that school system and delinquency system personnel are failing to 
deliver appropriate educational services and failing to accommodate 
children with disabilities. The outcomes also, however, often reflect 
failure by school system and delinquency system personnel even to 
recognize education-related disabilities. These outcomes suggest, 
furthermore, that decision-makers guarding the gates to the delinquency 
system generally, and to incarceration facilities particularly, treat 
children with education-related disabilities differently than children 
who are not disabled. In vastly disproportionate numbers, children who 
are poor and who are members of racial and ethnic minority groups 
populate the delinquency system. The disproportionate numbers, 
moreover, reflect the harsh reality that society imposes unequal and 
discriminatory treatment upon poor children of color. Researchers and 
journalists have documented the disproportionate representation and 
disparate, discriminatory treatment of children based upon race and 
class. In contrast, disproportionate representation and disparate, 
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children are substantially over-represented m the delinquency 
1 . ll5 popu at1on. 
IV. CHILDREN AND TEENAGERS CANNOT FORM INTENT IN THE 
SAME MANNER AS ADULTS, YET THEY ARE PROSECUTED UNDER 
THE SAME STATUTES USED TO PROSECUTE ADULTS 
In criminal law, the law not only punishes the alleged act, but also 
the state of mind, or intent, of the defendant. For example, in Florida, a 
discriminatory treatment within the delinquency system of children 
with disabilities has not been sufficiently studied and documented. 
Estimates of the correlation between delinquency and disabilities vary 
widely. 
Id. at 4-5. 
114 The term "alternative school" is used to describe schools where students are 
transferred for disciplinary reasons or because they have been suspended or expelled 
from mainstream schools. See Maureen Carroll, Racialized Assumptions and 
Constitutional Harm: Claims of Injury Based on Public School Assignment, 83 TEMP. L. 
REV. 903, 904 (2011) ("In a typical disciplinary transfer case, the student has been 
involuntary [sic] transferred from a mainstream school to an alternative program without 
the procedural safeguards that accompany formal expulsions. Many alternative schools 
used for this purpose have limited classroom instruction, strict disciplinary procedures, 
and no extracurricular activities. Often, the only students attending an alternative school 
are those placed involuntarily for disciplinary or remedial reasons. Students attending 
disciplinary programs face a dramatically higher risk of violence than those attending 
mainstream schools. Moreover, because of curricular differences, students returning to a 
mainstream school from an alternative program may be unable to advance to the next 
grade or to graduate with their peers."). 
115 See HEIDI M. HSIA ET AL., u. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DISPROPORTIONATE 
MINORITY CONFINEMENT 2002 UPDATE iii (2004) ("Although minority youth account for 
about one-third of the U.S. juvenile population, they comprise two-thirds of the juvenile 
detention/corrections population."); see also CARLE. POPE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF 
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE DELINQUENCY AND 
PREVENTION, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE 
RESEARCH LITERATURE FROM 1989 THROUGH 2001 (2002). 
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premeditated murder committed in the course of certain enumerated 
felonies is a capital crime. 116 By contrast, a homicide that occurs during 
one of the enumerated felonies "without any design to effect death" is a 
second-degree felony with a maximum fifteen-year sentence. 117 There is 
no requirement in the law that courts evaluate a child's ability to form 
criminal intent before the child is transferred to adult court. 
Many children facing charges in delinquency court are also in 
dependency proceedings, meaning that they have been abused, abandoned, 
or neglected by their parent(s). 118 Many other juvenile defendants have 
been victims of serious-often violent-physical, sexual, and emotional 
abuse. 119 This type of abuse has a direct impact on the functioning of the 
areas of the brain that control impulsive, risky, and unlawful behavior. 120 
Even before recent advances in neuroscience, psychologists 
recognized that adolescents do not form intent in the same manner as 
adults. As Dr. Marty Beyer, a leading expert in the area, explained: 
"[f]rom a psychological perspective, intention in children is a complex 
area, particularly considering their limited capacity to think ahead to the 
unforeseen long-term consequences of their immediate action." 121 
Critically, Dr. Beyer concluded "that from the standpoint of cognitive 
development, young people have diminished capacity to intend harm to 
116 FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 782.04(l)(a) (West 2014). 
117 FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 775.082(6)(d) (West 2014). 
118 See generally Denise C. Herz et. al., Challenges Facing Crossover Youth: An 
Examination of Juvenile-Justice Decision Making and Recidivism, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 305 
(2010). 
119 Id. 
120 See U.S. DEP'TOFHEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS, UNDERSTANDlNGTHEEFFECTS 
OF MAL TREATMENT ON BRAIN DEVELOPMENT (2009), available at 
https://www .childwelfare.gov/pubs/issue _briefs/brain_ development/effects.cfm. 
121 Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent, 7 KY. CHILD. RTS. J. 16, 
18 (1999) ("Carrying a weapon and even using a weapon does not mean a child had adult 
intent to harm."). 
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others or ant1c1pate harm as an unintended consequence of their 
actions." 122 Teenagers often demonstrate a disconnect between their 
actions and the resulting consequence. 123 Many teenagers see their 
behavior as the only option in a certain situation, but fail to recognize their 
responsibility for putting themselves in the situation in the first place. 124 
This "adolescent disconnect goes to the heart of culpability and results 
from an immature thought process (not anticipating unintended 
consequences; reacting to threat) and incomplete moral development." 125 
Abuse, trauma, and neglect further impact a young person's ability 
to form intent, as these factors can significantly alter brain development. 126 
This abuse includes emotional abuse. 127 After conducting extensive 
research, Dr. Martin Teicher concluded that "early maltreatment, even 
exclusively psychological abuse, has enduring negative effects on brain 
development." 128 In an observation particularly relevant to the appropriate 
punishment for young offenders, Dr. Teicher explained: 
Physical, sexual, and psychological trauma in childhood 
may lead to psychiatric difficulties that show up in 
childhood, adolescence, or adulthood. The victim's anger, 
shame, and despair can be directed inward to spawn 
symptoms such as depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, 
and post-traumatic stress, or directed outward as 
122 Id. at 18. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 18-19. 
126 See Martin Teicher, Wounds that Time Won't Heal: The Neurobiology of Child 
Abuse, 2 CEREBRUM (The Dana F. on Brain Sci., New York N.Y.), 2000, at 1. 
127 Id. 
12s Id. 
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aggression, impulsiveness, delinquency, hyperactivity, and 
substance abuse. 129 
79 
Some of the disorders strongly associated with child abuse are those that 
may cause unlawful behavior, such as borderline personality disorder or 
dissociative identity disorder. 130 Similarly, victims of child abuse may 
suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), the symptoms of 
which include "irritability or outbursts of anger" and "an exaggerated 
startle response." 131 Dr. Teicher argues that "the trauma of abuse induces a 
cascade of effects, including changes in hormones and neurotransmitters 
that mediate development of vulnerable brain regions." 132 Dr. Teicher and 
other scientists have identified "a constellation of brain abnormalities 
associated with child abuse," including limbic irritability, 133 deficient 
development, differentiation of the left hemisphere, 134 deficient left-right 
hemisphere interaction, 135 and abnormal activity in the cerebellar vermis 
(the middle strip between the two hemispheres of the brain). 136 Of 
particular relevance here are the effects of abuse on the development of 
i29 Id. at3. 
130 Id. 
m Id. 
132 Id. at 6. 
133 Id. at 5-6 ("[Limbic irritability is] manifested by markedly increased prevalence 
of symptoms suggestive of temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) and by an increased incidence 
of clinically significant EEG (brain wave) abnormalities."). 
134 Id. at 6 ("[This process is] manifested throughout the cerebral cortex and the 
hippocampus, which is involved in memory retrieval."). 
135 Id. ("[This process is] indicated by marked shifts in hemispheric activity during 
memory recall and by underdevelopment of the middle portions of the coipus callosum, 
the primary pathway connecting the two hemispheres."). 
136 Id. ("[This] appears to play an important role in emotional and attentional balance 
and regulates electrical activity within the limbic system."). 
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the hippocampus, which is involved in regulating memory and emotion. 137 
Dr. Teicher's findings demonstrate that child abuse has a direct impact on 
the ability of a youthful offender to form intent: 
To be convicted of a crime in the United States, one 
supposedly must have the capacity to both know right from 
wrong and to control one's behavior. Those with a history 
of childhood abuse may know right from wrong, but their 
brains may be so irritable and the connections from the 
logical, rational hemispheres so weak that intense negative 
(right-hemisphere) emotions may incapacitate their use of 
logic and reason to control their aggressive impulses. Is it 
just to hold people criminally responsible for acts they lack 
the neurological capacity to control? 138 
While studies demonstrate that every child's brain develops 
differently, and that such development directly impacts the child's ability 
to form intent and, ultimately, the appropriate punishment for the child's 
offense, the decision about whether to transfer a case to adult court is often 
made by a prosecutor who knows only the facts of the crime. As shown 
below, the Eighth Amendment requires that all relevant factors-including 
cognitive functioning, brain development, child abuse and neglect, 
educational neglect, mental illness, and many others unique to each child's 
case-be considered by a neutral trier of fact before a child is prosecuted 
as an adult. 
137 Id. ("Cells in the hippocampus have an unusually large number of receptors that 
respond to the stress hormone cortisol. Since animal studies show that exposure to high 
levels of stress hormones like cortisol has toxic effects on the developing hippocampus, 
this brain region may be adversely affected by severe stress in childhood."). 
Bs Id. 
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V. APPLICATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE TO MANDATORY TRANSFER AND DIRECT FILE 
STATUTES 
Analyzing mandatory transfer and direct file statutes implicates 
both the due process issues addressed in the early cases governing 
procedure in juvenile court and Eighth Amendment139 jurisprudence 
recognizing the impact of brain development on the proportionality of a 
particular punishment. Yet, only a handful of courts have addressed the 
Eighth Amendment issue, 140 and in each of these cases, an Eighth 
Amendment challenge based on Roper and Graham failed. 141 However, 
none of these cases conducted an in-depth Eight Amendment analysis. A 
number of Illinois cases upheld that state's mandatory transfer statute on 
the grounds that the statute did not itself impose a punishment; therefore, 
the Eighth Amendment was not implicated. 142 Similarly, an Arizona court 
139 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punislunents inflicted."). 
140 See State v. Vasquez, No. 2 CA-CR 2010-0371, 2012 WL 112668, at *l (Ariz. 
Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2012); People v. Pacheco, 991N.E.2d896, 906--08 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) 
(holding that mandatory transfer does not impose a punislunent and does not implicate 
the Eighth Amendment); People v. Jackson, 965 N.E.2d 623, 631-32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) 
(same); People v. Salas, 961N.E.2d831, 846-47 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (same). 
141 See Vasquez, 2012 WL 112668, at *l; Pacheco, 991 N.E.2d at 906--08; Jackson, 
965 N.E.2d at 631-32; Salas, 961 N.E.2d at 846-47. 
142 See Pacheco, 991 N.E.2d at 907; Jackson, 965 N.E. 2d at 632 ("The automatic 
transfer provision does not dictate any form of punislunent as that term is used 
throughout criminal statutes. Because the automatic transfer provision does not mandate 
or even suggest a punislunent, any analysis as to whether or not it violated the Eighth 
Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punislunent is futile. The automatic 
transfer provision does not impose any punislunent. Therefore, it is not subject to the 
Eighth Amendment."); Salas, 961 N.E.2d at 845-46 ("[T]he automatic transfer statute at 
issue here does not impose any punislunent on the juvenile defendant, but rather it only 
provides a mechanism for determining where defendant's case is to be tried, i.e., it 
provides for the forum in which his guilt may be adjudicated. The punislunent imposed 
on defendant here, specifically, his 50-year sentence of imprisonment, was made pursuant 
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held that while transfer exposed a juvenile to a greater punishment, the 
transfer itself was not a punishment, and, as a result, did not implicate the 
Eighth Amendment. 143 
Yet a statute does not have to impose a criminal sentence in order 
to be considered punitive for Eighth Amendment purposes. 144 In the 
seminal case of Trap v. Dulles, the Supreme Court recognized that 
whether a statute is penal or not cannot be determined simply by its 
label. 145 As Justice Warren wryly noted: "[h]ow simple would be the tasks 
of constitutional adjudication and of law generally if specific problems 
could be solved by inspection of the labels pasted on them!" 146 In 
determining if a statute is penal, the "Court has generally based its 
determination upon the purpose of the statute. If the statute imposes a 
disability for the purposes of punishment-that is, to reprimand the 
wrongdoer, to deter others, etc., it has been considered penal." 147 A statute 
is non-penal if "it imposes a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish 
some other legitimate governmental purpose." 148 
to the Unified Code of Corrections and not pursuant to the automatic transfer statute. As 
the automatic transfer statute does not impose any punishment, it is not subject to the 
Eighth Amendment."). 
143 Vasquez, 2012 WL 112668, at *3 ("Although being tried as an adult exposes the 
juvenile offender to the risk of more severe punishment than being adjudicated in the 
juvenile system, the transfer itself is not a form of punishment for purposes of the Eighth 
Amendment. Thus, the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment is simply not implicated by the transfer itself."). 
144 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1958). 
145 Id. at 94-95. 
146 Id. at 94. 
147 Id. at 96. 
148 Id. at 96-97 ("The Court has recognized that any statute decreeing some adversity 
as a consequence of certain conduct may have both a penal and a nonpenal effect. The 
controlling nature of such statutes normally depends on the evident purpose of the 
legislature. The point may be illustrated by the situation of an ordinary felon. A person 
who commits a bank robbery, for instance, loses his right to liberty and often his right to 
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Mandatory transfer and direct file statutes impose an increased 
punishment for penal purposes: to punish the wrongdoer and to deter 
others. A youth transferred to adult court faces a potential sentence that is 
decades longer than what she would face in juvenile court, is housed in an 
adult jail (although, some states require that juveniles remain separated 
from adults), is considered an adult for purposes of any other pending 
charges, and, may remain detained prior to trial significantly longer than 
would be allowed in juvenile court. 149 The decision to transfer a youth to 
adult criminal court is made based primarily on the charge150 and the 
youth's history in delinquency court. 151 In fact, in cases of mandatory 
vote. If, in the exercise of the power to protect banks, both sanctions were imposed for 
the purpose of punishing bank robbers, the statutes authorizing both disabilities would be 
penal. But because the purpose of the latter statute is to designate a reasonable ground of 
eligibility for voting, this law is sustained as a nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate 
the franchise."). 
149 See generally ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS, supra note 58. 
150 See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 985.556(4)(c) (West 2014) (decision to transfer child to 
adult court based upon seriousness of offense, aggressiveness, willfulness or violence of 
the offense, whether offense was against a person or property, probable cause, whether 
any co-defendants are adults or children, child's sophistication and maturity, child's 
previous history and record and prospects for rehabilitation); Kent v. United States, 383 
U.S. 541 (1966). 
151 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (West 1996) ("Evidence of the following factors 
shall be considered, and findings with regard to each factor shall be made in the record, in 
assessing whether a transfer would be in the interest of justice: the age and social 
background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the 
juvenile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's present intellectual development and 
psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to 
such efforts; the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral 
problems. In considering the nature of the offense, as required by this paragraph, the 
court shall consider the extent to which the juvenile played a leadership role in an 
organization, or otherwise influenced other persons to take part in criminal activities, 
involving the use or distribution of controlled substances or firearms. Such a factor, if 
found to exist, shall weigh in favor of a transfer to adult status, but the absence of this 
factor shall not preclude such a transfer."); see also Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 
4th 537, 565--67 (Cal. 2002) (noting that direct file provisions typically give both juvenile 
and adult criminal courts the power to hear cases involving certain juveniles-
84 Virginia Journal of Criminal Law [Vol. 3:52 
transfer, the transfer is dictated solely by the nature of the offense. 152 
There is no mandate for the state or any court to consider mitigating 
factors. 153 
In Trap, the Court made it clear that any statute that imposes a 
disability for the purposes of punishment-that is, to reprimand the 
wrongdoer or to deter others-is penal. 154 Clearly, the purpose of transfer 
is at once to reprimand the wrongdoer and deter others. The Supreme 
Court itself noted that, "[i]t is clear beyond dispute that the waiver of 
jurisdiction is a 'critically important' action determining vitally important 
statutory rights of the juvenile." 155 As noted above, the transfer decision is 
made primarily based on the offense and the youth's delinquency history. 
It would be entirely disingenuous to argue that a transfer statute that 
exposes a youth to sentence of fifty, sixty, or seventy years in adult prison 
rather than several years in a juvenile program has a purpose other than 
punishment. While the language of the transfer statute itself may not 
impose a punishment, mandatory transfer and direct file statutes are 
indisputably penal in nature and are subject to Eighth Amendment 
scrutiny. 
The purpose of the Eighth Amendment is not solely to prohibit 
torture and extreme forms of punishment. Rather, it embodies "broad and 
idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and 
particularly those of a certain age, those with certain offending histories, and/or those 
accused of certain offenses-and leave it up to prosecutors to make discretionary 
decisions regarding where to file them). 
152 See ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS, supra note 58, at 4 (noting that fifteen 
states require transfer to adult criminal court in cases that meet "specified age/offense or 
prior record criteria"). 
153 Id. (describing mandatory transfer criteria and omitting any reference to 
mitigation). 
154 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958). 
155 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). 
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decency ... against which [courts] must evaluate penal measures." 156 The 
Graham court specifically recognized that "[a]n offender's age is relevant 
to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that fail to take 
defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be flawed." 157 In 
Roper, the Court explained that "[r]etribution is not proportional if the 
law's most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or 
blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth 
and immaturity." 158 While transfer is not the most severe penalty, a 
sentence of fifty years is essentially a life term and falls well within 
Graham's proscription of such sentences. As noted above, two "virtual 
life" cases are currently pending before the Florida Supreme Court and 
other similar challenges have been made across the country. 159 
While courts in Illinois and Arizona have held that a transfer 
statute itself does not impose a particular punishment, a close examination 
of the law demonstrates that that is not, in fact, the case. In Florida, for 
example, a seventeen-year-old charged with a second-degree felony 160 
would face a maximum sentence of commitment to a juvenile program 
until his nineteenth birthday, while the same youth would face up to 
fifteen years in adult prison if transferred to adult court. 161 If the court 
156 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 
571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)). 
157 Graham v. Florida, 540 U.S. 48, 76 (2010). 
158 Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2004). 
159 See Gridine v. Florida, 89 So. 3d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), rev. granted by 
Gridine v. Florida, 103 So. 3d 139, No. SC12-1223, 2012 WL 4839014, at *l (Fla. Oct. 
11, 2012); Henry v. Florida, 82 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012), rev. granted by 
Henry v. Florida, 107 So. 3d 405, No. SC12-578, 2012 WL 5991345, at *l (Fla. Nov. 6, 
2012). 
160 See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 810.02(3) (West 2011) (noting that a common offense for 
juveniles is burglary of a dwelling, which is a second-degree felony in Florida). 
161 See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 775.082(3)(c) (West 2014) (noting that the exact sentence 
of a juvenile is determined by the Department of Corrections using a complicated score 
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adjudicated the youth as a "youthful offender," the maximum term in 
prison would be reduced to six years. 162 Therefore, by virtue of sentencing 
laws, a transfer to adult court, in and of itself, imposes a significantly 
longer sentence than a child faces if tried in juvenile court. As the court 
noted in Trap, the Eighth Amendment applies to any cruel and unusual 
sentence, and "the existence of the death penalty is not a license to the 
Government to devise any punishment short of death within the limit of its 
. . . "163 1magmat10n. 
Applying the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to 
mandatory transfer and direct file statutes leads to the conclusion that such 
statutes are unconstitutional. The Court's recognition of the diminished 
culpability of juvenile offenders and the impact that other individualized 
factors, such as cognitive function and social history, have on culpability 
requires an individualized hearing before a juvenile judge before a case 
can be transferred to adult criminal court for prosecution. Proponents of 
direct file and mandatory transfer point to the fact that the Supreme Court 
looks at legislative trends when evaluating "evolving standards of 
decency" 164 for Eighth Amendment purposes and note that no state has 
implemented mandatory transfer hearings. However, every state has 
recognized through its statutes that age is relevant to the transfer decision. 
With a few exceptions, every state has a minimum age for transfer. 165 In 
addition, while the Court looks to state legislatures for indications as to 
"evolving standards of decency," the Court has made it clear that "the 
Constitution contemplates that the Court's own judgment be brought to 
sheet. Depending on the youth's history, it is likely that the child will face a sentence of 
at least ten years if charged as an adult). 
162 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 958.04(2)(d) (West 2008). 
163 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958). 
164 Jd.; see also Graham v. Florida, 540 U.S. 48, 76 (2010) (same); Roperv. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566--67 (2004) (evaluating legislative trends in standards of 
decency). 
165 See ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS, supra note 58, at 4 (reporting that 
most, but not all, transfer statutes require a minimum age for transfer to adult court). 
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bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty." 166 The same 
reasoning applies to mandatory transfer and direct file statutes. It is not at 
all certain that the Court would conclude that current transfer statutes 
indicate a consensus among American citizens that a fourteen-year-old 
should face a fifty-year sentence. The issue involves complex questions of 
proportionality, developmental neuroscience, rehabilitation, and 
deterrence. These are issues with which most Americans are not familiar. 
Moreover, in evaluating the constitutionality of a particular punishment, 
the Court looks at the goals of the punishment at issue. 167 Typically, the 
goals of a criminal statute are retribution and deterrence. 168 Studies have 
shown that juveniles transferred to adult court have a higher recidivism 
rate than juveniles adjudicated in the juvenile delinquency system. 169 
Just as a penalty-phase jury must be allowed to consider any 
mitigating factor that could result in a sentence less than death, a juvenile 
judge presiding over a transfer hearing should consider all relevant factors, 
including the child's social history, mental health, cognitive functioning, 
and any other relevant factors. Florida allows direct file for certain 
offenses for children as young as fourteen. 170 As both common sense and 
166 Roper, 543 U.S. at 552. 
167 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (discussing the goals of the 
death penalty, retribution and deterrence, as applied to intellectually disabled offenders). 
168 Id.; see also Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (noting that the 
traditional goals of punishment are retribution and deterrence). 
169 See Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to 
Delinquency?, in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF 
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN 3 
(2010), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/220595.pdf. 
170 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.557(1) (West 2011) (providing that the State is able to 
directly file fourteen- and fifteen-year olds charged with a list of offenses including, inter 
alia: arson, sexual battery, robbery, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated 
assault, aggravated stalking, murder, manslaughter, and aggravated battery). In 
considering the list of offenses, it is important to note the difference in the severity of the 
offenses. Aggravated assault, for example, is assault with a deadly weapon absent the 
intent to kill. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.021. "Deadly weapon" has been defined very 
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developmental neuroscience indicate, not all fourteen-year-olds are the 
same. The author of this article had a client who was direct filed at 
fourteen for his second offense (the first was petit theft). The charge was 
armed burglary of a dwelling. The facts indicated that the youth had gone 
along with his older brother and other adults after his older brother picked 
him up from school. While the offense is, of course, serious, there was no 
injury to the victim. Had a transfer hearing been held, defense counsel 
would have put forth evidence demonstrating the youth's lack of criminal 
history, his relative youth compared to the other defendants, the fact that 
his brother picked him up from school and drove him to the scene, and the 
fact that, while chronologically fourteen, school records indicated an 
intellectual disability that caused him to function several years behind his 
chronological age. Because Florida allows discretionary direct file, 
however, none of this evidence was presented. The youth was transferred 
to adult court and faces a very uncertain future. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this article has attempted to demonstrate that direct 
file and mandatory transfer statutes do not survive Eighth Amendment 
scrutiny. The cases that have upheld such statutes against an Eighth 
Amendment challenge have mistakenly relied on the form of the statute 
rather than its actual impact. Given the Court's recent jurisprudence, 
which recognizes that a child's mental capabilities are fundamentally 
different from those of an adult, the Eighth Amendment requires 
individual transfer hearings that comport with due process before a 
juvenile can be transferred to adult criminal court. 
broadly by the Florida courts. See FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIM. CASES§ 
82 ("[A] weapon is a 'deadly weapon' if it is used or threatened to be used in a way likely 
to produce death or great bodily harm."). The author has seen juveniles charged with 
aggravated assault where the "deadly weapon" was a chair, a bicycle, and a lamp. 
Common sense dictates that there is a substantial difference between throwing a chair and 
murder. 
